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CIVIL PROCEDURE/ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION-New Mexico Applies Collateral Estoppel
to Issues Fully and Fairly Litigated In Arbitration
Proceedings: Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Housing
Committee of New Mexico, Manufactured Housing Division
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Housing Committee of New Mexico,
Manufactured Housing Division,' the Supreme Court of New Mexico
held that collateral estoppel applies to issues which are fully and fairly
litigated in an arbitration. The court's decision establishes clear law
regarding the preclusive effect that arbitration decisions may have on
subsequent litigation. This Note focuses on the court's decision to apply
collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions, provides the historical background leading to the application of collateral estoppel to arbitration
decisions, analyzes the court's reasoning in Rex, Inc., and explores some
of the implications that Rex, Inc. may have on the practice of law in
New Mexico.
Ii. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Atkins contracted with Rex, Inc. (Rex), a dealer of manufactured
homes, to purchase a mobile home for her disabled son. 2 Later, when
Atkins was unable to obtain financing for the mobile home, she wrote
a letter to Rex demanding that it return her down payment of $15,250.
Because Rex was licensed by the state Manufactured Housing Division
(MHD), Atkins also forwarded a copy of the letter to the MHD. In
response, Rex notified the MHD that it would not refund the down
payment and that it intended to enforce the contract for the full purchase
price of $54,735. Atkins filed a civil action against Rex seeking a refund
of her down payment.
On May 4, 1992, the Manufactured Housing Committee (MHC) issued
a notice of contemplated action against Rex for failure to refund Atkins'
full deposit, in violation of MHD regulations.3 The notice stated that
there was sufficient evidence to suspend or revoke Rex's dealer's license
and to attach Rex's consumer protection bond. Atkins and Rex then
settled their lawsuit. The settlement agreement provided that Rex would
refund all but ten percent of the purchase price and would pay Atkins'
1. 119 N.M. 500, 892 P.2d 947 (1995).
2. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 502-04, 892 P.2d at 949-51. Unless otherwise cited, all subsequent
references to the facts of this case refer to this citation.
3. Relevant portions of MHD Regulations 207(B) and 207(C) provide that deposits on special
ordered units will be refunded in full, less a maximum of ten percent of the selling price to defray
dealer expenses, and that such refund shall be provided within one business day, but in no case
later than five business days. Deposits, N.M. Manufactured Hous. Div. Reg. 207(B),(C), 2 N.M.
Reg. No. 7, 8 (Apr. 15, 1991).
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costs and attorney's fees. The parties further agreed to arbitrate the
disposition of the remaining ten percent of Atkins'. deposit. At arbitration,
the arbitrator awarded Rex $3,724.24 to defray Rex's expenses in the
aborted sale and awarded the remaining balance of the deposit to Atkins.
After reviewing the arbitrator's decision, the MHC decided to pursue
administrative action against Rex. Following a hearing, the MHC issued
its ruling that Rex had violated two MHD regulations, ordered Rex to
return the remaining $3,724.24 to Atkins, attached Rex's consumer protection bond for that amount, and suspended Rex's dealer's license for
thirty days, providing that the suspension would be stayed upon the
return of Atkins' money. Additionally, the MHC placed Rex's license
on probation for a period of six months.
On appeal, the district court upheld the MHC ruling and order. Rex
appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court, asking for review of the
MHC order. The supreme court reversed the MHC's order requiring Rex
to pay Atkins $3,724.24, as well as the conditional thirty day suspension
of Rex's dealer's license. 4 The court held that collateral estoppel applied
to arbitration proceedings and ruled that the MHC was in privity with
Atkins to the extent that it was pursuing Atkins' interests. Nevertheless,
the supreme court upheld the MHC's order placing Rex's license on
probation for six months, holding that an administrative agency could
when the agency
not be collaterally estopped by an arbitration award
6
was acting on behalf of the broader public interest.
III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1925, the federal government passed the Federal Arbitration Act 7
which declared arbitration agreements to be "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable." ' Following the lead of the federal government, many states
began adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act. 9 New Mexico was one of
these states, adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1971.10
New Mexico public policy favors dispute resolution through arbitration
because it allows for the informal, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
disputes.1" This policy is firmly established in New Mexico common12 and
statutory13 law and was expressly reaffirmed in Rex, Inc.' 4 In pursuit of

4. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 513, 892 P.2d at 960.
5. Id. at 509, 892 P.2d at 956.
6. Id.
7. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 105 (1989).

8. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
9. See generally, 2 EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, § 2, at 2 (1994).
10. 1971 N.M. Laws ch. 168, § 1. The Uniform Arbitration Act is now embodied in N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (1978).
11. Fernandez v. Farmer's Insurance Co., 115 N.M. 622, 625, 857 P.2d 22, 25 (1993).
12. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 504-05, 892 P.2d at 951-52; Fernandez, 115 N.M. at 25, 857 P.2d
at 625.
13. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-7-1 (1978); United Technology and Resources, Inc. v. Dar Al
Islam, 115 N.M. 1, 3, 846 P.2d 307, 309 (1993); Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Rose, 92 N.M. 527,
530, 591 P.2d 281, 284 (1979).
14. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 504-05, 892 P.2d at 951-52.
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this policy favoring arbitration, many states, including New Mexico, have
decided to apply collateral estoppel to issues decided in an arbitration." s
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, is a doctrine that
promotes judicial economy by preventing the relitigation of ultimate facts
or issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in a previous suit.16
In the past, New Mexico required mutuality of parties before collateral
estoppel could apply. 7 However, in Silva v. State, 8 the New Mexico
Supreme Court discarded the mutuality requirement and allowed the use
of offensive or defensive collateral estoppel where the party against whom
collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or privy to the original action. 9
With the adoption of non-mutual collateral estoppel, "the Court [has]
mov[ed] away from technical definitions and standards for the imposition
of ... collateral estoppel and toward determinations based on a policy
' 20
of finality that is to be arrived at on a case by case basis.
Several other jurisdictions have decided that non-mutual collateral estoppel applies to issues decided in an arbitration. In cases applying
defensive collateral estoppel to arbitration proceedings, the courts have
applied the doctrine in much the same way they apply it to issues decided

15. "Essential to arbitration remaining useful is the elementary principle that ... collateral
estoppel [is] applicable to arbitration awards." Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Management Sys.,
Inc., 471 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). For states applying collateral estoppel to arbitration,
see Leahy v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 697, 700 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995); Taylor v. Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co., 656 N.E.2d 134, 139 (II1. App. Ct. 1995); Brougher Agency, Inc. v. United
Home Life Ins. Co., 622 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Cooper v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 589 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 437 N.W.2d
679, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 452 N.W.2d 648; International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local
1285 v. City of Las Vegas, 823 P.2d 877, 880 (Nev. 1991); Nogue v. Estate of Santiago, 540 A.2d
889, 890 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); Hilowitz v. Hilowitz, 444 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981); Dunlap v. Wild, 591 P.2d 834, 837 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); Manu-Tronics, Inc., 471
N.W.2d at 268.
16. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 504, 892 P.2d at 951. Before collateral estoppel may apply, however,
the moving party must demonstrate that:
(1) the [non-movant] was a party (or privy) to the prior proceeding, (2) the cause
of action presently before the court is different from the cause of action in the
prior adjudication, (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior adjudication, (4)
the issue was necessarily determined in the prior adjudication. If the moving party
demonstrates each element of this test, the court must then determine whether the
non-moving party "had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in prior
litigation."
Id.
17. International Paper Co. v. Farrar, 102 N.M. 739, 741, 700 P.2d 642, 644 (1985).
18. 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
19. See Silva, 106 N.M. at 474-76, 745 P.2d at 382-84.
[D]efensive collateral estoppel may be applied when a defendant seeks to preclude
a plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost
regardless of whether defendant was privy to the prior suit; . . . offensive collateral
estoppel may be applied when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from
[rellitigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully regardless
of whether plaintiff was privy to the prior action.
Id. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
20. Local 2839 of Am. Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Tom Udall,
111 N.M. 432, 437, 806 P.2d 572, 577 (1991).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

in judicial proceedings. 2 ' If all of the elements of collateral estoppel are
present, and the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, defensive
collateral estoppel is applied. 22 Fewer cases apply offensive collateral
estoppel to issues decided in arbitration. 23 While several courts have stated
that offensive collateral estoppel could potentially apply to issues decided
few have actually precluded re-litigation of an issue
in an arbitration,
24
on this basis.

One of the primary conditions that courts have placed on the application
of collateral estoppel to arbitration is the requirement that the parties
had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue sought to be
precluded. 25 Because the procedures used in arbitrations tend to be less
formal than those used in litigation, courts must be careful to ensure26
that parties have a chance to a full and fair hearing on important issues.
Without satisfaction of the "full and fair opportunity" requirement,
collateral estoppel based on an arbitration would be a violation of due
process .27
Factors that courts consider to determine whether parties have had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 21 In Rex, Inc., the New Mexico Supreme Court set forth a non-

21. See, e.g., Wellons v. T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1989); Maidman v.
O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Brougher Agency, Inc. v. United Home Life Ins.
Co., 622 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Dunlap v. Wild, 591 P.2d 834, 837-838 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1979).
22. See cases listed supra note 21.
23. See generally cases listed infra note 24.
24. See, e.g., Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991), in which the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the application of offensive collateral estoppel, but stated
that its decision might have been different had the initial decision been made by a district court
rather than an arbitrator. But see Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131,
1136 (5th Cir. 1992) (declining to apply offensive collateral estoppel where defendants' interests were
not adequately represented in the arbitration); Spencer v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.,
644 F. Supp. 172, 174-75 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (declining to apply offensive collateral estoppel where
the defendants contested the arbitrator's jurisdiction and thus did not participate in the initial
arbitration hearing); United States ex rel. Pensacola Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 705 F. Supp. 306, 312, n.5 (W.D. La. 1989) ("Since an arbitrator need not base his decisions
according to law and since his decisions are basically non-reviewable, it is doubtful that offensive
use of collateral estoppel would be permissible."). See also United Food and Commercial Workers
Int'l Union-Industry Pension Fund v. Bartusch Packing Co., 546 F. Supp. 852, 856 (D. Minn.
1982); Ufheil Constr. Co. v. Town of New Windsor, 478 F. Supp. 766, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd,
636 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1980); Tofany v. NBS Imaging Systems, Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1036-37
(Ind. 1993).
25. See Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 679, 681, (Minn. Ct. App.), aff'd, 452
N.W 2d 468 (1989); Taylor v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 656 N.E.2d 134, 141 (Il1. App. Ct.
1995); Brougher Agency, Inc. v. United Home Life Ins. Co., 622 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1993); Nogue v. Estate of Santiago, 540 A.2d 889, 891 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1988);
Dunlap v. Wild, 591 P.2d 834, 838 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
26. See Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Hous. Comm. of New Mexico, Manufactured Hous. Div.,
119 N.M. 500, 505, 892 P.2d 947, 952 (1995); Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946
F.2d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1992).
27. Universal American Barge Corp., 946 F.2d at 1136. Collateral estoppel generally applies "as
long as the party had a procedural, substantive, and evidentiary opportunity to be heard on the
issue." Taylor v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 656 N.E.2d 134, 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
28. For factors that other jurisdictions have considered when determining a full and fair opportunity to litigate, see Bronder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313,
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exhaustive list of factors to assist courts in determining whether the "full
and fair opportunity" requirement was satisfied:
whether the non-movant had the incentive to vigorously litigate the
prior action, whether procedural differences between the two actions,
such as representation by counsel, presentation of evidence, questioning

of witnesses, and appellate review, would make preclusion unfair, and
whether policy considerations exist to deny any preclusive effect.
Additionally, the formality of the proceedings, the scope of the ar-

bitration, and the definiteness of the decision will influence whether
29
an arbitrator's factual findings should be given preclusive effect.

Once the elements of collateral estoppel are established and a court is
fully satisfied that parties have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues, collateral estoppel will apply to issues decided in arbitration
proceedings.30

IV.

RATIONALE

The New Mexico Supreme Court in Rex, Inc. based its decision to
apply collateral estoppel to arbitration on considerations of judicial economy. 3' In coming to its decision, the court considered Fernandez v.
Farmer's Insurance Co., 32 which described the degree of judicial review
that courts should give to arbitration awards.3 3 In Fernandez, the court
noted New Mexico's strong public policy favoring dispute resolution
through arbitration, stating that arbitration "allows for the informal,
speedy, and inexpensive final disposition of disputes .. . and also aids

in relieving the judiciary's heavily burdened caseload. 3 4 In Rex, Inc.,
the court affirmed the importance of arbitration and summarily held that
the same judicial economy considerations described in Fernandez supported the application of collateral estoppel to arbitration awards.35

332-33 (1971) (whether the plaintiff in the prior action chose to litigate at that time and place;
whether the party was prepared to litigate against the defendant there involved; whether the court
purported to apply the applicable legal standards; failure of the court to grasp the technical subject
matter and the issues in suit; whether, without fault of his own, the party was deprived of crucial
evidence or witnesses in the prior litigation). See also Welch v. Johnson, 907 F.2d 714, 726 (7th
Cir. 1990); Sullivan v. American Airlines, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 226, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
29. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 504-05, 892 P.2d at 951-52.
31. Id. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952.
32. 115 N.M. 622, 857 P.2d 22 (1993).
33. Rex, Inc. 119 N.M. at 504-05, 892 P.2d at 951-52.
34. Fernandez v. Farmer's Ins. Co., 115 N.M. 622, 625, 857 P.2d 22, 25 (1993) (citations
omitted).
35. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952. The court further supported its holding by
citing several other authorities: In Re American Ins. Co., 371 N.E.2d 798, 801 (N.Y. 1977) (stating
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration awards as they do to adjudications
in judicial proceedings); Neff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993)
(noting that an arbitration proceeding can be the basis for collateral estoppel when the parties
receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues); Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Management
Sys., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (stating res judicata and collateral estoppel
are essential for arbitration to remain useful); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 (1980);
Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel Using Preclusion to Shape Procedural
Choices, 63 TUL. L. REV. 29, 33-36 (1989).
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The key to the Rex, Inc. decision was its requirement that lower courts
be "particularly vigilant" in examining whether the arbitration proceeding
provided parties with a "full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.''36
Recognizing the procedural informality of most arbitrations, the court
conditioned the application of collateral estoppel on the opportunity of
the parties "for presentation of evidence and argument substantially

similar in form and scope to judicial proceedings

. .

.

.

7

As an aid to

the courts, the supreme court provided a non-exhaustive list of factors
for determining whether an arbitration provided adequate procedural
safeguards.3" Only when an arbitration provides sufficient procedural
safeguards may collateral estoppel apply to issues decided in an arbitration. 39
Much of the Rex, Inc. decision focused on explaining how the MHC
could be collaterally estopped from acting against Rex when the MHC
was not a party to the arbitration between Atkins and Rex. 4° Instead of
relying on non-mutual collateral estoppel, the court held that the MHC
was bound as a privy to Atkins to the extent that it sought relief on
Atkins' behalf as an individual claimant seeking individual relief. 4' The
court also held, however, that the MHC could not be bound as a privy
to an individual when it was acting to vindicate the public interest. 42
Thus, while the MHC was collaterally estopped from trying to recover43
Atkins' deposit and from suspending Rex for failure to return the deposit,
it was not estopped from placing Rex on probation for violation of MHD
regulations which protect a broad public interest. 44
V.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

"Fully and Fairly Litigated" Requirement
The Rex, Inc. "fully and fairly litigated" requirement should prevent
unfairness in the application of collateral estoppel if courts apply the
standard with the vigilance that the Rex, Inc. court recommended.4 5 This
requirement is particularly important in the context of arbitrations because
arbitrations tend to provide fewer procedural safeguards than judicial
proceedings. 46 In comparison with judicial litigation, arbitrations limit the

A.

36. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952.
37. Id.
38. See supra text accompanying note 29.
39. See Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952.
40. Id. at 507-10, 892 P.2d at 954-57.
41. Id. at 509, 892 P.2d at 956.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 513, 892 P.2d at 960.
44. Id. at 509, 892 P.2d at 956.
45. See 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952.
46. Id.
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scope of discovery, usually excluding the use of depositions and interrogatories, and do not apply formal rules of evidence.47 Additionally,
arbitrating parties give up the right to appellate review of most aspects
of the arbitration award. 48 The courts justify this limitation on the grounds

that the parties to an arbitration have voluntarily bargained for the
decision of an arbitrator and
have assumed the risks of and waived
49
objections to that decision.
Although Rex, Inc. did not demand that arbitrations provide all of
the procedural benefits that judicial proceedings provide, 0 it was appropriate not to do so. Parties benefit from the lack of procedural requirements associated with arbitration and often choose to arbitrate for this
very reason." As long as an arbitration presents parties with an opportunity to present "evidence and argument substantially similar in form
and scope to judicial proceedings," the parties should be sufficiently

protected.
factors53

2

Additionally, the Rex, Inc. court's "non-exhaustive"

list of

provides further equitable protection to arbitrating parties by
allowing courts to consider any additional policy factors which may affect
the fairness of applying collateral estoppel to a particular case.5 4 This
approach is in accord with the court's recent trend of evaluating the
applicability of collateral estoppel on a case-by-case basis rather than
relying solely on technical definitions and standards. 5
The scope of the meaning of "full and fair opportunity" to litigate
in arbitration has been interpreted differently in other jurisdictions. The
Illinois Appellate Court stated, "The 'full and fair opportunity' requirement is satisfied even if only a slight amount of evidence was presented

47. See, e.g., Typical Features of Litigation and Arbitration, DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A
GUIDE FOR DRAFTERS OF BUSINESS AGREEMENTS (special supplement to ALTERNATIVES) May 1994, at
71.
48. Courts may vacate arbitration awards only under the following circumstances: when the
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; there was evident partiality,
corruption, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of the parties; the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
the arbitrator refused to postpone the arbitration for cause or disallowed evidence, causing prejudice
to the parties; or there was no arbitration agreement. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12(A) (1978).
Additionally, an arbitration award may be vacated where an arbitration panel's mistake of fact or
law is so gross as to imply misconduct, fraud, or lack of fair and impartial judgment. Fernandez
v. Farmer's Insurance Co., 115 N.M. 622, 625, 857 P.2d 22, 25 (1993). The New Mexico Supreme
Court has stated that courts do not have the authority to review arbitration awards for legal or
factual errors because it would undermine arbitration's goal to provide a fast and inexpensive
resolution of disputes. Id. at 624, 857 P.2d at 24.
49. Board of Educ. of Carlsbad Mun. Sch. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 476, 882 P.2d 511, 517
(1994).
50. Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952 (collateral estoppel will only apply when
arbitrations provide opportunity for the parties to present evidence and argument "substantially
similar in form and scope to judicial proceedings" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 84 cmt. c (1980))).
51. See generally Fernandez, 115 N.M. at 625, 857 P.2d at 25 (stating arbitration "allows for
the informal, speedy, and inexpensive final disposition of disputes").
52. See Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952 (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Local 2839, 111 N.M. at 437, 806 P.2d at 577.
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on the disputed matter decided in the first suit." '5 6 In contrast, Rex, Inc.
seems to require a more rigorous reviewing procedure when it states that
courts must be "particularly vigilant" in examining whether the parties
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 7 Considering the voluntary
and the informal nature of arbitration, the Rex, Inc. approach provides
greater safeguards to ensure that parties had a full and fair hearing on
the issues disputed in the arbitration. Basing collateral estoppel on only
a slight amount of evidence increases the chance that parties may be
bound by an arbitration where the procedures used are not "substantially
similar in form and scope to [those used in] judicial proceedings." 5 8 The
Rex, Inc. approach will therefore provide greater reassurance to the parties
that they will be bound only where there has been a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues. 5 9
The primary problem with the "fully and fairly litigated" requirement
is that it provides no firm way to know in advance whether or not
collateral estoppel will apply in later litigation. Because Rex, Inc.'s list
of factors is discretionary, 6° judges may apply collateral estoppel based
on any number of different factors they find to be important. As a
result, attorneys will have a difficult time providing complete legal advice
on the future preclusive effect of arbitration. Additionally, the "full and
fair opportunity" standard leaves attorneys and clients with little guidance
to determine the level of resources they must expend to ensure that
arbitration procedures are sufficient to provide for collateral estoppel.
Effect of Collateral Estoppel on Judicial Economy
Although the Rex, Inc. court justified the application of collateral
estoppel to arbitration awards on the basis of judicial economy, collateral
estoppel may impact judicial economy in conflicting ways. First, applying
collateral estoppel to arbitrations will affect judicial economy positively
because it will prevent relitigation of issues already decided in the arbitration. Alternatively, however, collateral estoppel may affect judicial
economy negatively if parties perceive that collateral estoppel may preclude
litigation of issues where the stakes are much higher than those addressed
in an arbitration. Rex, Inc. attempts to prevent this result by cautioning
courts to consider whether a party had the incentive to vigorously litigate
in the arbitration before applying collateral estoppel. 61 This warning,
however, may not always produce the result that the client wants. For
example, in Clemens v. Apple, 62 a defendant who did not participate in
an arbitration was able to assert non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel
B.

App. Ct. 1995). See
56. Taylor v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 656 N.E.2d 134, 141 (Ill.
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
57. See Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952.
58. See id.(emphasis added).
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. 477 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
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to prevent the plaintiff from bringing a $250,000 lawsuit on the basis
of an arbitration where the amount at stake was less than $2,000.63 In
support of its decision, the court stated, "Although the amount at stake
in the arbitration proceeding . . . was far less than the damages being
sought in this action . . . it [was] not an insignificant amount . . .
Thus, although arbitration decisions now have greater preclusive effect,
knowing that they may be bound
fewer parties may choose to arbitrate,
6
in later, more significant litigation.
In cases involving offensive collateral estoppel, parties are afforded
greater protection against preclusion in cases with third parties. Relying
on Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Silva v. State warned against the use of offensive collateral estoppel in
cases:
where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action[,] ...
where a defendant had little incentive to defend vigorously in the
first suit, where the judgment relied upon as a basis for estoppel is
itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of
the defendant, or where the second action affords the defendant
procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could have
easily caused a different result. 66
In the context of arbitration, several of these factors are rarely met.
First, most arbitrations do not provide an "easy" means for joinder of
parties. 67 Second, because of arbitration's informal nature, a defendant
will likely be able to employ procedural devices in a judicial proceeding
which were not available in the first arbitration action. 68 Based on these
criteria, courts should have strong reasons to deny application of offensive
69
collateral estoppel to issues decided in an arbitration. Thus, the Silva

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Jay Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue
Preclusion Make an Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of Law?, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 63, 84 (1986); DATR, supra note 9, at 24-28.
66. Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 475, 745 P.2d 380, 383 (1987) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979)). See also Marcia A. Mobilia, Offensive Use of Collateral
Estoppel Arising Out of Non-Judicial Proceedings, 50 ALB. L. REV. 305, 317 (1986); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
67. See, e.g., Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Jersey City, 607 A.2d
1314, 1318 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("arbitration by its nature does not provide a forum
conducive to extensive issue and party joinder . . ."); Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 667 A.2d
649 (Md. 1995). For a list of factors that courts have considered in deciding whether a party could
have easily joined the earlier action, see Mobilia, supra note 66, at 318.
68. See Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952.
69. Rex, Inc., however, did not answer this issue, but rather was concerned only with the basic
question of whether collateral estoppel applied to the arbitrating parties themselves. The New Mexico
Supreme Court said that the MHC was bound by the arbitration between Atkins and Rex because
the MHC stood as a privy to Atkins. Id. at 507, 892 P.2d at 954. In spite of the Parklane Hosiery
Co. factors, "[t]he United States Supreme Court [has] declined to bar [outright] the offensive use
Universal Am.
of collateral estoppel from arbitration in subsequent federal court litigation ....
Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223 (1985)). The decision of whether to apply offensive collateral
estoppel depends on the totality of the circumstances and is up to the discretion of the judge. See
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
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factors provide greater protection to arbitrating parties and may positively
affect judicial economy by encouraging them to arbitrate.
Although the Rex, Inc. and Silva factors help to eliminate unfairness
in the application of collateral estoppel to arbitration decisions, the
discretionary nature of collateral estoppel in the arbitration context adds
an element of unpredictability to the decision to arbitrate. Parties may
become wary of arbitrating if they perceive that arbitration of small

conflicts may bind them in more significant litigation. 0 Applied carefully,
however, the Rex, Inc. and Silva factors will protect parties against

unfairness, encourage arbitration of disputes, and continue to enhance
collateral estoppel's goal of judicial economy.
C.

Limiting Collateral Estoppel in the Arbitration Agreement

An interesting question which Rex, Inc. did not address is whether
parties may limit the preclusive effect of an arbitration decision by
contract. Case law from other jurisdictions indicates that attorneys may
be able to limit preclusion in the arbitration agreement.,' For example,
in Muse v. Cermak,7 2 the court held that an agreement between two

parties to limit the binding effect of an award in a later proceeding must
be honored.7 3 Other jurisdictions, however, indicate that parties may limit
preclusion as between the contracting parties, but that they cannot bind
74
non-contracting third parties.
In contrast with Muse, other courts have held that parties may not
contractually determine the preclusive effect of an arbitration agreement.
In Amalgamated Transit Union Local Union 313 v. Rock Island County

Metropolitan Mass Transit District,75 one party argued that collateral
estoppel could not apply to issues decided in their arbitration because
the arbitration agreement did not specify that collateral estoppel was to
apply. 76 The court disagreed, explaining: "Parties do not have the power
to alter the applicability of th[is] judicially created doctrine . . . . -77 Thus,

70. DAUER, supra note 9, at 24-28.
71. See, e.g., Muse v. Cermak, 630 A.2d 891, 893 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Kerins v. Prudential
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 585 N.Y.S.2d 637, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 84(4) (1982).
72. 630 A.2d 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
73. Id. at 893; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84 cmt. h (1982) ("limitations
on preclusion should normally be given effect under principles of contract law, for the parties are
under no obligation to submit themselves to arbitration with broader effects than may be agreed
upon"). Muse was a personal injury action in which one insured sued the other insured. 630 A.2d
at 892, 893. Interestingly, the agreement to limit collateral estoppel, which limited the preclusive
effect of the arbitration on the same or similar issues in companion claims, was between two
insurance companies. Id. at 893. Thus, the court denied preclusion even though the disputing parties
in Muse were not parties to the arbitration agreement. Id. at 892. Due to the facts of the case,
the court did not address whether parties may also contract in the arbitration agreement to ensure
that collateral estoppel does apply. See id.
74. In re American Ins. Co. v. Messinger, 371 N.E.2d 798, 804 (N.Y. 1977).
75. 551 N.E.2d 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
76. Id. at 653.
77. Id.
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collateral estoppel is not rendered inapplicable by the parties' failure to
provide for it in their contract.
Although courts disagree about whether parties may contractually determine the applicability of collateral estoppel, New Mexico should allow
parties to contractually determine the applicability of collateral estoppel
among themselves. As in Muse, there are likely to be situations in which
parties will choose to seek a preliminary determination of rights through
arbitration, but prefer to litigate further disputes in judicial proceedings.
Although this approach creates the potential for inconsistent results, the
parties would bear the potential benefits and risks of this result just as
in any other agreement they have bargained for. Allowing parties to
contract preclusion among themselves will enhance the predictability of
arbitration, encourage more parties to submit
their claims to arbitration,
78
and further augment judicial economy.
D. Sculpting Arbitration to Promote or Prevent Collateral Estoppel
Attorneys representing clients in an arbitration may also have the chance
to influence preclusion at the time of arbitration. If, upon entering an
arbitration, a party foresees that collateral estoppel may affect later
judicial litigation, the party may be able to use the factors in Rex, Inc.
to design an arbitration decision that either will or will not meet the
requirements needed to establish collateral estoppel. However, this may
be a high risk plan if the parties expect that collateral estoppel will not
apply, but a court later disagrees. This approach may be most useful
for parties who are already bound to go to arbitration, and would like
a last attempt to try to prevent collateral estoppel from applying.
If the party wants to ensure that collateral estoppel will apply to issues
decided in an arbitration, the party should provide the opposing party
with as many procedural safeguards as possible. 79 Additionally, the party
should request that the issues be decided individually so that the courts
can determine which issues were actually litigated and necessarily decided
in the arbitration. 0 If, however, a party believes that collateral estoppel
will negatively affect future litigation, the party should seek a simple
arbitration with few procedural safeguards and no way to determine
which issues were necessary to the arbitration decision. 8 ' Crafting such
procedures will not invalidate the decision in the initial arbitration because
arbitration decisions may be vacated only upon the limited circumstances
set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act. 2 Instead, crafting protective
procedures will only make it easier or more difficult to apply collateral
estoppel in subsequent arbitral or judicial proceedings.

78. See G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and CollateralEstoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration,
35 UCLA L. Rav. 623, 674 (1988).
79. See Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952.
80. See id.; DAUER, supra note 9, at 24.
81. See Rex, Inc., 119 N.M. at 505, 892 P.2d at 952.
82. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12 (1978).
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CONCLUSION

In Rex, Inc., the New Mexico Supreme Court held that collateral
estoppel applies when parties have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues in arbitration. If courts are particularly vigilant in
ensuring that parties have a full and fair opportunity to litigate their
disputes before collateral estoppel applies, then more parties are likely
to submit their disputes to arbitration. If, however, courts apply collateral
estoppel so that small arbitrations are binding in later litigation with
third parties, then some parties may be discouraged from arbitrating their
disputes. In either case, parties may be able to limit preclusive effect
either by contract or by crafting arbitration procedures so that they will
not support collateral estoppel.
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